[Assam] Wasbir Hussein in Tehelka
Barua25
barua25 at hotmail.com
Wed Sep 27 00:41:31 EDT 2006
>United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)
I wonder who has given rights to these people to change the names of other organizations at will?
And why not AT change its own to Asom Tribune?
For sake of Jesus Christ, let us have some sense.
Rajen Barua
----- Original Message -----
From: "Chan Mahanta" <cmahanta at charter.net>
To: <assamrs at gmail.com>; <assam at assamnet.org>
Sent: Tuesday, September 26, 2006 10:45 PM
Subject: [Assam] Wasbir Hussein in Tehelka
> I don't agree with everything here, but it is a whole lot more
> sensibly written piece than the Sentinel garbage.
>
>
>
> EDIT-OPINION
>
> So Near, Yet So Far in Assam
>
> More than Delhi, ULFA stands to lose if it were to back out of the
> peace initiative now
>
> Wasbir Hussain
>
> Wasbir Hussain
> During the past year, the government and the United Liberation Front
> of Asom (ULFA) - by far the most potent separatist group in
> northeastern India - were simultaneously engaged in the complex game
> of war and peace. ULFA was against a formal ceasefire although it
> expressed its desire to talk peace. Sounds weird, but that had been
> the case and, not surprisingly, such a stand where the sound of the
> peace bugle was getting drowned by the roar of ULFA bombs was not
> getting the two sides anywhere near a breakthrough for peace in
> Assam. New Delhi seemed to have realised this and surprised
> insurgency watchers on August 13 by unilaterally announcing a 10-day
> suspension of military operations against ULFA as a 'goodwill
> gesture'. ULFA reciprocated five days later by saying it would also
> put its offensive on hold. New Delhi has since followed up its
> Independence Day gambit by extending the temporary truce twice to
> give a further push to the pursuit for peace in the state of 26
> million people.
>
> Today, if one is talking about the chances of direct talks between
> the government and ULFA in the days to come and the possibility or
> the shape of a solution to the 27-year-old insurrection in Assam, it
> is because of the rebel group's September 2005 move to set up a peace
> panel called the People's Consultative Group (PCG).
>
> The PCG, none of whose 11 members belong to ULFA, was mandated to
> clear the roadblocks and prepare the grounds for direct talks between
> the rebel leadership and New Delhi. What the PCG, headed by
> celebrated Assamese writer Indira Goswami, has achieved during the
> three rounds of formal talks it held with government leaders between
> October 2005 and June 2006, and the subsequent informal meetings, is
> to impress upon New Delhi that this opportunity for peace talks with
> ULFA must not be lost. After all, for the first time since its
> formation in 1979 to fight for a 'sovereign, socialist, Assam', ULFA
> has formally set up a peace panel and has announced a halt in its
> offensive, albeit temporarily.
>
>
> The inability of the government agencies to speak in one voice is
> complicating matters. As if the current impasse is not enough, an
> Army statement recently said ULFA was heavily under the influence of
> the ISI and was actually engaged in extortion and regrouping during
> the ongoing truce period
> The ground situation has certainly changed since New Delhi's August
> 13 truce announcement. Take a look at the following statistics before
> the cessation of hostilities: according to Assam Police figures,
> between September 8, 2005 (the PCG was formed on September 7, 2005)
> and June 2006, ULFA militants had triggered off as many as 52 blasts.
> During the same period, at least 41 civilians were killed and 135
> injured in ULFA violence. And in the 10 days preceding New Delhi's
> truce announcement, ULFA had launched several grenade or bomb
> attacks, killing a dozen people, including six security personnel,
> and injuring up to 40 others.
>
> Yes, ULFA has not carried out any violence since August 14, but are
> the two sides anywhere near talking peace in the changed
> circumstances? Unfortunately, the breakthrough, if at all, out of all
> the rounds of talks so far between the ULFA-appointed PCG and the
> government seems to have ended with the truce, that is uneasy to say
> the least. The stalemate has actually begun only now. While ULFA is
> sticking to its demand for the release of five of its jailed senior
> leaders - all members of the group's highest policy-making central
> committee - for them to meet and take a decision on entering into
> direct peace negotiations, the government is pressing for a written
> commitment from ULFA saying it was indeed interested in a peace
> dialogue. New Delhi is also worried on another count, and precisely
> to allay that fear, the PCG members have been sending out signals
> that the freed militants would not leave the country after their
> release.
>
> There is a precedent of top ULFA leaders jumping bail and going
> underground after a meeting with Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in 1992.
>
> The following are some of the roadblocks thus far, preventing a
> possible face-to-face meeting between ULFA and the government of
> India:
>
> * New Delhi asking ULFA to name its negotiating team. ULFA saying the
> team cannot be named unless the five senior leaders are freed.
>
> * New Delhi asking ULFA to give its consent for the talks in writing.
> ULFA responding by saying the government must also state in writing
> that it would discuss the group's key demand of 'sovereignty'.
>
> * ULFA demanding to know the whereabouts of 14 of its cadres
> 'missing' after the Bhutanese military assault in December 2003, and
> the authorities remaining silent on the matter.
>
> The lack of an institutionalised response mechanism with the
> government is largely responsible for the hurdles in negotiating
> insurgency. Well, by now New Delhi, as also everyone else, knows that
> ULFA's main demand is sovereignty. Now if ULFA is to state its demand
> in a letter to the Prime Minister's Office or the ministry of home
> affairs, it is bound to result in a reply from New Delhi saying
> India's sovereignty was not negotiable and that the government cannot
> discuss the issue under any circumstances. That would hardly lead to
> any breakthrough on the talks. What both ULFA and the government
> should stick to is to insist on unconditional talks, now that a lot
> of ground has been covered since the rebel-appointed peace panel
> emerged a year ago and went on to hold talks at the level of the
> prime minister and the home minister.
>
> The inability of the government agencies to speak in one voice is
> further complicating matters. As if the current impasse is not
> enough, the Army has suddenly decided to join issue. An Army
> statement last fortnight, issued through the Press Information Bureau
> (Defence Wing), said ULFA was heavily under the influence of
> Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence and was actually engaged in
> extortion and regrouping during the ongoing truce period. The Army
> statement also said that ULFA was engaged in a fake currency racket
> and that its leaders were running big businesses in Bangladesh.
> Later, a section of the media quoted unnamed Army sources as saying
> the statement was 'unauthorised'. It is time people made up their
> minds on such delicate issues.
>
> But, deadlocks are meant to be broken and, even on this occasion, it
> could break sooner than later. It is important to note that, more
> than New Delhi, ULFA stands to lose if it were to back out of the
> peace initiative now, without valid and justifiable grounds. A
> question may be asked as to why has ULFA suddenly decided to go into
> peace mode. It would be simplistic to assume that the rebel group has
> taken this initiative because it is facing reverses or that it has
> ceased to be a cohesive group in the wake of the sustained military
> offensive since 1990. What cannot be denied, however, is that ULFA is
> under pressure from the civil society in Assam to resolve its
> problems in a peaceful manner.
>
> Now, assuming that the two sides agree to actually talk peace, what
> is that ULFA could settle for to bring the curtains down on its armed
> struggle? That's the million-dollar question because it isn't so
> simple to imagine that any agitating outfit can achieve sovereignty.
> Ethnic groups in Assam like the Bodos have been granted autonomy. The
> Karbis and the Dimasas too enjoy some amount of autonomy. But can the
> majority Assamese also be given autonomy under a new constitutional
> arrangement? Then again the definition as to who are the 'Assamese'
> is also a crucial question. If the Bodos, Karbis, Dimasas etc are
> also to be bracketed under the broad term 'Assamese' and regarded as
> part of the greater Assamese society, which they actually are, will a
> possible autonomy package include them too and further increase the
> autonomy these ethnic groups are already enjoying? Things are hazy to
> say the least, and much will depend on ULFA also continuing to talk
> in one voice until an acceptable solution is arrived at.
>
> Hussain is director,
> Centre for Development and
> Peace Studies, Guwahati
>
> Sep 23 , 2006
>
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