[Assam] AssamNet Netizens likely to find this even handed report coming from Sri Lanka giving an insight into India adopting a similar warpath in Assam. Recalling that the LTTE is India’s creation and the ULFA is an extension of the indigenous Assam identity

[Bartta Bistar]

Sri Lankan civil war: neither *
appeasement nor escalation **
by Jehan Perera *

http://www.newagebd.com/oped.html                                           10
January 2007


COLOMBO: The two bombs that exploded in crowded public buses on two
successive days in the south of Sri Lanka far from the conflict zones of the
north and east have revealed the vulnerability of the general population to
terrorist attack. When the Basque separatists in Spain planted a bomb in the
parking lot of the airport, they called on three occasions to give warnings.
As a result only two people died when the bomb went off. But in the case of
the buses in Gampaha and Hikkaduwa, there were no such warnings. The bomb
blasts killed over twenty and injured another hundred, including children.
As these were deliberate attacks targeted on innocent civilians they need to
be condemned in the strongest possible terms, as indeed the government of
Japan did immediately.
   The Sri Lankan government has accused the LTTE of carrying out these
attacks, which the LTTE has denied. But there is reason, apart from past
track record, to point to the LTTE as the perpetrator of these attacks.
Earlier in the week, the LTTE's political wing leader, SP Tamilselvan has
warned of severe repercussions in the aftermath of the alleged air force
bombing of a civilian settlement in Mannar in the north. The government
denied this attack and instead claimed success in destroying an LTTE naval
base in the area. But the Bishop of Mannar confirmed with his own eyewitness
account that those killed in the attack had been 14 civilians, including
children.
   Those who travel in crowded public buses and those who live on the sea
coast are the less privileged sections of society. Instead of glad tidings,
the new year brought forth evil deeds and consequences to those innocent
people who were getting about their ordinary business in the most trying of
circumstances. It appears that the LTTE has found its low-cost equaliser to
the government's air force bombing that has been damaging LTTE assets on the
ground. Such aerial bombing can also be inaccurate, as even better air
forces in the world, have been known to bomb civilians instead of their
targets. Attacking civilians in the government-controlled areas by the
simple stratagem of placing bombs in crowded public places, could be a means
to put the government under pressure.
   Until the two bombs hit the south, there had been a hope that the LTTE
might not resort to their past practice of attacking soft targets as a means
of putting the government under pressure. It was believed that the LTTE's
concern for international support, and possibly even a de-banning of the
organisation, would keep them away from explicitly targeting civilians. But
developments in the past year have revealed that the international
community's displeasure with the government will not translate into active
support for the LTTE. Due to its lack of preparedness to renounce violence,
the LTTE has remained beyond the pale for much of the international
community.

   Vain hope
   There had also been a vain hope that the government's security system,
which is headed by reputed fighting generals and crime busters, would also
keep the country safe from terrorist attacks. In place of grim realism, a
vision of final victory has also been placed before the people. Army
commander, General Sarath Fonseka, himself a victim of an LTTE suicide
attack on army headquarters in Colombo in the early part of last year, has
been the architect of the re-emergence of hope in the total vanquishing of
the LTTE. Under his leadership the level of recruitment into the armed
forces has reached high levels, and the reverse flow of desertions is at its
lowest ever.
   In a recent public statement, the army commander has said that the war
would be taken to the north, after first clearing the LTTE from the east,
with final victory thereafter. Although the media is now engaging in
self-censorship due to the draconian nature of the Prevention of Terrorism
law, the general pattern of news suggests that the government forces are
indeed gaining ground in the east, albeit at a higher cost and slower pace
than promised. From a technical and military point of view, it may very well
be the case that the army commander's publicly expressed views are in
keeping with what is possible on the ground. But the question is, whether
the political, human and economic costs of such a protracted war are
bearable and desirable or not.
   In a political democracy, the final decisions relating to war and peace,
and to the costs thereof, are made by the democratically elected political
leadership, and not by the military or by the bureaucracy. Although the
constitution decrees him to be the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces,
President Mahinda Rajapaksa has kept a distance between himself and a total
embrace of war and the ruthlessness it entails. In the face of the
possibility of the LTTE resuming systematic attacks on soft targets, the
president has essentially three options open to him.
   The first option, and the one likely to be favoured by the military and
by the government's nationalist allies, is to take severe punitive action
against the LTTE. In fact this appears to be the government's current
strategy towards the LTTE from the early part of last year. The government's
retaliatory strategy first manifested itself in the response to the
attempted assassination of General Fonseka by an LTTE suicide bomber. The
government reacted to that incident by ordering its air force to bomb LTTE
military targets in the north and east. On this occasion, too, the
government could decide to do the same, and choose targets that indicate an
escalation of the war.

   Opportune moment
   However, a democratic government which is accountable to people at
elections, and that is party to international agreements has more
constraints than an organisation that is neither elected nor accepted
internationally. It will be difficult for the government to seek to outdo
the LTTE in the practice of terror and emerge unscathed. There will be
political constraints of a domestic and international nature that make it
difficult for the government to succeed in any endeavour that leads to an
escalation of terror. A population that has been broadly supportive of
military action when that action is taking place elsewhere, may turn against
that strategy when the bombs start exploding in their own midst.
   On the other hand, the second option that is available is also likely to
be unacceptable. This would be to make the armed forces honour the Ceasefire
Agreement. The defeats suffered by the LTTE in the east, and the pounding of
their bases by the air force, have eroded the position of the LTTE.
Therefore, the possibility of the government changing its strategy in this
manner because of the attacks on civilian targets is extremely slim. In
fact, the government has already announced that its military operations,
which it describes as being defensive in nature, will continue. A reduction
of military pressure on the LTTE at this time may seem too much like
appeasement, of which the present government leadership and its nationalist
allies accused the former government.
   A major plank of the present government's electoral strategy was to
depict the former government of opposition leader Ranil Wickremesinghe as
having appeased the LTTE instead of standing up to it manfully. Ironically,
it was during Wickremesinghe's period of leadership that the LTTE suffered
its greatest setback when its eastern leadership deserted. However, the
government's nationalist election strategy resonated with the popular ethos
and saw President Rajapaksa being hailed as the deliverer of peace with
dignity instead of peace through appeasement.
   In these circumstances it may be necessary for the president to consider
a third option. During the past year, the government's strategy towards the
ethnic conflict has been determined to a great degree by the military and
the Sinhalese nationalists in the ruling coalition. But President Rajapaksa
has not totally identified himself with the nationalist camp. He has
advocated a negotiated political settlement and repeatedly said he would
like to talk face to face with LTTE leader Velupillai Pirapaharan. In
addition he has summoned an All-Party Conference to find a political
solution to the ethnic conflict, and signed a Memorandum of Agreement with
the main opposition party that would ensure bipartisanship in the pursuit of
peace. The present crisis would be an opportune time for President Rajapaksa
to pull these strands together in a complex and multi-faceted strategy for
peace.
   *Jehan Perera is media director of the National Peace Council in Colombo,
Sri Lanka. He can be reached at: Jehan Perera jehanp at yahoo.com*
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