[Assam] Mr Sud, study the depth of insurgency in the EastSouthAsia. At least FIFTEEN MILLION mutinous indigenous ESA inhabitants rising up as a deadly foe against the Indian army and administration give a clear picture of the ‘writing on the wall’.

[Bartta Bistar]

Commentary: China's military prowess in Tibet

http://www.upiasiaonline.com/security/2007/10/23/commentary_chinas_military_prowess_in_tibet/

TORONTO, Oct. 23

HARI SUD

 Column: Abroad View

A successful invasion of India by China is the China watcher's pipedream.
They always envision that China could unleash its army of 2.5 million men on
India and conquer it. That would only be possible if China were able to
muster all its 2.5 million soldiers on the India-Tibet border, however. This
is highly unlikely. If they did, they would meet India's army of 1.1 million
men, ready to spoil their party. These China lovers in the West have become
more vociferous since China completed its Tibet-China rail link. They
believe it has become very easy for the Chinese to move men and materials to
Tibet.

    This newly built rail link is a paper tiger. It is so open to a missile
or air attack that it would be foolish for the Chinese military to consider
it as a vital supply link. Bridges and tunnels in large number on this route
could be targeted by Indian Brahmos cruise missiles. Rebuilding them would
be a long process. In addition, the hostile Tibetan populace could make it
impossible for this rail link to function.

    China maintains about 16 to 18 divisions in Tibet, facing India in
Arunachal Pradesh and Akash Chin in Kashmir. A minor disposition of troops
is maintained in the central sector to safeguard supply routes. In all,
240,000 men are lightly equipped mountain divisions, foot mobile and very
vulnerable to heavily equipped Indian troops across the Himalayas. China's
more heavily armed troops are retained in Chengdu military district, 800
miles away.

    The Chinese air force is a bulky, poor quality force. It has a very
limited number of high performance aircraft from Russia. The Chinese have
reverse engineered a few Russian and American models, but these copies are
poor quality. Most of these aircraft are deployed opposite Taiwan. Even if
some were relocated to the Indian border, they would have trouble landing
and taking off at elevations of 7,000 to 8,000 feet, with their full
complement of armaments in Tibet. That makes it difficult for them to match
Indian fighter aircraft.

    China's navy faces certain death, including its aircraft carriers and
their nuclear submarines, if they venture far away from their homeports. In
any India-China war, it is unlikely that the West would either stay neutral
or go to the Chinese side. They would be delighted if the Chinese navy
suffered a major reverse at the hands of the Indians. This they could ensure
by providing timely information to India on its movements.

    Hence, it would boil down to a fight between China's lightly equipped
infantry and India's medium to lightly equipped infantry. The army with
superior tactics, knowledge of the ground and high-tech surveillance would
carry the day. The last military match in 1962 went to China, as Indians
were poorly equipped and poorly deployed.

    The Chinese know the Indian military advancements well. They also know
about their own vulnerability in Tibet. In the last ten years, when they
increased their defense expenditures substantially in Tibet, they built four
new airfields and several new missile bases. This in fact has bolstered
their offensive capability, but it also made them targets to tactical
theater missiles.

    China spends US$90 billion in defense-related expenditures every year.
It admits to only US$50 billion. The rest is hidden in secret state security
operations and development projects unrelated to the military. Also a bulk
is spent on nuclear submarines, nuclear missiles and aircraft carriers to
match the West. Although China's military expenditure at US$45 billion is
huge, yet consider this: China has to support an army of 2.5 million men, an
Air Force of 3,000 old aircraft and a navy of 250,000 men, with 45
submarines, destroyers, battle cruisers and other naval craft. Considering
the size of the military forces, this much expenditure is about average.

    Until 1995, Chinese ground forces and air force were equipped with
1950s-era hardware all supplied by the Soviet Union. The Soviets withdrew
all military support from China after the Chinese demanded the return of
large tracts of land from the Soviet Union. The Ussiri River military
clashes followed. This falling out was never repaired. Hence the Chinese
were stuck with old and very old hardware until about 1995. Modernization is
now underway, but modernizing a 2.5 million force is a long and tedious job,
especially when no modern hardware is available for purchase.

    China's current military commitments are also large. The country has
stationed 20 percent of its forces on the China-Russia border. The other 30
percent are stationed opposite Taiwan, together with the bulk of their
high-tech hardware. Of the remaining 50 percent of its forces, about 50
percent are reserves (about 20 divisions) and the remaining forces face
India and other Southeast Asian neighbors like Vietnam, Myanmar, and
Thailand.

    Hence it is not a very large force that faces India.

    China does have one advantage -- Chinese troops and garrisons are very
close to the India-Tibet border. This will allow them to reinforce their
border guards very quickly. They could maintain huge pressure on India's
forward positions. That would give them a huge psychological advantage. The
disadvantage would be that depleting the reserves in Tibet would be an
invitation to Tibetan rebels to take advantage. India would surely help.

    Facing all this, India has equipped a total of eight mountain divisions,
with four more that could easily convert to mountain warfare. These are foot
mobile and are larger in strength than their Chinese counterparts. They are
trained in mountain and snow warfare. Their equipment is a couple of shades
heavier than that of the Chinese. These troops are stationed a bit farther
away from the border, which is a disadvantage. But the Indian border guards
occupy high ground, which would be an advantage in a defensive battle. They
could hold the line until the bulk of the army arrived.

    Overall India spends about US$22 billion a year on its defense forces,
which number about 1.1 million and 600 combat aircraft and two dozen
submarines, two aircraft carriers and a multitude of other vessels. About 50
percent of India's defense commitments are Pakistan-related. The remaining
50 percent are divided between protecting the border with China, internal
security and reserves. India's military hardware is a bit more
sophisticated. These are not reverse-engineered copies but the real thing,
hence a bit superior. Israel has been India's conduit for sophisticated
hardware. Other sophisticated hardware is procured through open bidding.

    The road networks on both the Indian and the Chinese sides are not well
developed. The Chinese, because they were on a plateau, would find
themselves at an advantage in reaching the border compared to the Indians.
That again would be a psychological advantage.

    The situation would change immediately if India vacated its isolated
forward positions in favor of a better defensive line and waited for the
Chinese. If the Chinese did come, they would immediately suffer the
disadvantage of distance from their supply bases, with the mountains in
between. This would neutralize their numbers advantage.

    Indian tactical missiles, if cleverly placed, could play havoc to the
Chinese supply lines. The Tibetan plateau is open and treeless without
cover.

    India's combat-ready Air Force is more than a match for anything the
Chinese could throw at the Indians. The Indians come from bases which are at
about sea level and carry heavier combat loads. These bases are located well
within 300 to 400 miles of the India-China border.

    The same advantage does not exist for the Chinese. First their fighter
planes are inferior, second they cannot carry their full payload as the
available runway length at elevations of 7,000 to 9,000 feet limits the
payload, and third the airbases are in open area and could be constantly
monitored by Indian AWACS. Hence the Chinese would fight a defensive air
war. This would be an advantage for India.

    In short, China would fight a highly unsuccessful military campaign
should they ever think of a rematch with India. The Indians are much better
prepared today than in 1962. The military dispositions of India and China
are evenly matched in Tibet, with the Indians having an equipment advantage.
No walkover like in 1962 is possible now.

    --

    (Hari Sud is a retired vice president of C-I-L Inc., a former investment
strategies analyst and international relations manager. A graduate of Punjab
University and the University of Missouri, he has lived in Canada for the
past 34 years. (c)Copyright Hari Sud.)
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